Foreign capital, Non-Traded Goods and Welfare in a Developing
Economy in the presence of Externalities
Introduction
In a two-commodity, two-factor full-employment setting for a small open economy, an inflow of foreign capital with complete repatriation of foreign capital income does not change social welfare. However, in the presence of a tariff the result is different. Brecher and Alejandro (1977) have found that inflows of foreign capital are necessarily immiserizing if the import-competing sector is capital-intensive and is protected by a tariff. Here welfare is defined as a positive function of national income.
An inflow of foreign capital leads to an expansion of the capital intensive importcompeting sector thereby cutting back the volume of trade further for a small open economy and moves it further away from the free trade situation, which is the optimal policy. In the literature, the Brecher-Alejandro proposition has also been re-examined in terms of three-sector full-employment models like Marjit (1992a, 1992b) with the third sector being a duty-free zone.
As the developing countries are plagued by economic dualism of different types, factor market distortions and structural rigidities, some attempts have been made to analyze the welfare impact of foreign capital inflow using a Harris-Todaro (1970) framework 1 . For example, Khan (1982) has considered a mobile capital Harris- Todaro (HT) model with urban unemployment. A third sector, called an urban informal sector, which absorbs the unemployed urban workers at a low and competitive wage rate, has been introduced in the works of Grinols (1991) , Chandra and Khan (1993) and Gupta (1997) . The immiserizing result of foreign capital in the 1 The introduction of labour market distortion in the form of unionized wage in the urban formal sector in an HT structure can in no way affect the welfare result relating to foreign capital due to a special property, called 'envelope property', implied by this framework. In an HT framework, the average wage of labour in the economy is equal to the rural sector wage. Once the rural sector wage remains unchanged, there is no labour reallocation effect on welfare due to foreign capital inflow, and therefore, results are similar to those obtained in a full-employment framework.
presence of a tariff protected import competing sector has been found to be valid in general 2 despite the presence of an additional sector.
Many economists have now successfully been able to show that foreign capital might be welfare improving in the developing economies in several cases. The works like Marjit and Beladi (1996) , Chaudhuri (2005 Chaudhuri ( , 2007 and Chaudhuri et al. (2006) have demonstrated how foreign capital might produce favourable effects on welfare taking into consideration some essential features of the developing economies e.g. existence of labour market distortion, presence of the vast informal economy and non-traded goods. In particular, as found in the works of Marjit and Beladi (1996) Chaudhuri (2005) has shown that even in a 2×2 full-employment structure with tariff and labour market distortions, an inflow of foreign capital may be welfare-improving. Also Chaudhuri (2007) has found that in an HT structure with agricultural dualism and a non-traded final commodity, it is possible to show that an inflow of foreign capital might improve social welfare.
A foreign direct investment (FDI) is often accompanied by transfer of superior technologies of production that raises the productivity of the workers in the capitalreceiving countries through externalities. There exists a large theoretical literature dealing with such aspects. 3 However, this literature has paid very little attention to analyzing the consequence of such an FDI-induced technology transfer on the welfare of the developing countries using the simple general equilibrium structure. Notable exceptions are, however, Chaudhuri (2001b Chaudhuri ( , 2005 where an inflow of foreign capital is accompanied by transfer of technology that raises the efficiency of labour and hence the effective labour force in efficiency unit. In the former work social welfare worsens following an expansion of the tariff-protected, import-competing sector while in the latter welfare is likely to improve owing to an increase in aggregate wage 2 Grinols (1991) is, of course, a notable exception.
3 See for example, Markusen (1995 Markusen ( , 2002 , Norback and Persson (2002) , Neary (2002 Neary ( , 2003 , Markusen and Venables (1999) , Mattoo et al. (2004) , Blalock and Gertler (2008) owned by foreign capitalists 6 so that the return from it is fully repatriated. The endowments of the three primary inputs in the economy are , L K and N , respectively.
All the factors of production are fully employed. Production functions in sectors 1 and 2 exhibit constant returns to scale with diminishing marginal productivity to each factor. In sector G we have fixed-coefficient technology. 7 Finally, commodity 1 is assumed to be the numeraire so that 1 1 P = .
4 It is a well-known trade-theoretic result that in a small open economy the optimal tariff is zero. However, the government in a developing economy like India finds no alternative but to keep some tariffs on importables owing to political pressures keeping in view the employment preserving effects of tariffs. Furthermore, in a developing economy with multiple distortions the effect(s) of any parametric changes on social welfare might change enormously compared to the one distortion case. This is because the effects of different distortions might move in the two opposite directions nullifying each other's effects. Hence the net welfare effect depends on the relative magnitudes of different effects.
5 An employment subsidy in the form of a wage subsidy by the same rate in the two unionized sectors is not advisable in the present context because of the following reasons. It lowers the effective wage cost of labour in the two unionized sectors and raises the return to capital of type K i.e. r (see Equation 2 ). This lowers the competitive wage,W (see Equation 1) of the common workers. In a large democratic developing country like India, the implementation of this policy would be vehemently opposed by political parties on the ground that it would increase poverty and income inequality.
The general equilibrium is represented by the following set of equations.
Here, ji a is the amount of the j th input required to produce one unit output of the i th
Besides, r and R are the returns to capital of type K and capital of type N , respectively. t is the ad-valorem tariff rate on the import of good 2.
is the effective or tariff-inclusive price of commodity 2. Finally, G P is the price of the non-traded good (services), G , which is domestically determined.
Equations (1) - (3) are the competitive industry equilibrium conditions in the three sectors.
The average efficiency of the workers, h , is considered to be a positive function of the total amount of production (and hence consumption) of commodity, G  8 and is given
Hence the labour endowment in efficiency unit is given by
where Li i a X is the employment of labour (in efficiency unit) in the i th sector of the economy for 1, 2, i G = .
It should be pointed out at this stage that sector G uses LG G a X efficiency units of labour apart from two types of capital in its production to produce G X units of commodity G . The production of commodity G , which is fully consumed by workers (domestic consumers), raises the average efficiency of the workers through creation of externalities. If G X rises by one per cent, sector G employs LG λ per cent of the labour force additionally while it raises the labour force in efficiency unit by G ε per cent in the margin, where
> is the elasticity of the labour efficiency function, ( ) G h X , with respect to G X . It is sensible to assume that sector G (say, healthcare) is a net supplier of labour input in efficiency unit which implies that
LG G λ ε < .
Complete utilization of capital of type K and capital of type N can be expressed respectively as follows.
where 
This implies that the demand for commodity G has the usual own price and income effects.
The consumption subsidy on commodity G , denoted, z , is financed by a portion of the tariff revenue earned by the government from the import of commodity 2 and is given by
The demand function for the import commodity, denoted 2 D , is given by * 2 2 2 ( , )
All commodities are normal with negative and positive own price and income elasticities of demand, respectively. Commodity G is a necessary good having a low own price elasticity of demand (in absolute terms). It does not depend on the relative price of commodity 2, * 2 P , so that the cross-price elasticity is zero. We make the simplifying assumption that the levels of demand for the other two commodities do 10 In the standard trade theory, it is usually assumed that the government collects the tariff revenue from the import of the importables (commodity 2 in the present case) and pays it back to the consumers in a lump-sum manner. In this case, from the aggregate tariff revenue the government holds back z amount (exogenously fixed) for financing the consumption subsidy and the rest is transferred to the consumers in a non-distortionary fashion.
not depend on the relative price of commodity G i.e.
11
Commodities 1 and 2 are, however, gross substitutes implying
The national income at domestic prices, denoted , Y is given by
where
− is the tariff revenue net of the subsidy on consumption of good G which is transferred to the consumers in a lump-sum fashion. All foreign capital incomes are completely repatriated.
Since commodity (services) G is consumed domestically, its supply is circumscribed by its demand. Therefore, in equilibrium, we have
In this model there are three types of distortion namely, commodity market distortion in the form of an import tariff on sector 2, labour market distortion in the form of exogenously given unionized wage in sector 2 and sector G and the presence of a nontraded final good (services), the consumption of which creates externalities. Since the consumption of the non-traded final good (services) creates externalities there is a consumption subsidy from the perspective of social welfare. (1), W is found. Equation (3) determines R as function of G P . Then G X is solved from equation (7) as function of G P . Plugging of G X in equations ( (5) and (6) 
The balance of trade equilibrium requires that
or equivalently,
there are still a lot of structural rigidities, technological and economic backwardness and different types of dualism which need to be removed fast for achieving high rate of economic growth and development. However, in many cases in a democratic set-up the political parties stand in the way of implementing reformatory policies at the desired pace.
The volume of import of good 2, denoted M , is given by the following equation.
Comparative Static Exercises
In the present model where the average efficiency of labour is determined endogenously by the size of sector G (say, healthcare) an inflow of foreign capital apart from increasing the capital stock of the economy may also affect the effective labour endowment measured in efficiency unit due to externalities. It will affect the output composition, price of the non-traded good and social welfare. In this backdrop we examine the effects of foreign capital of both types on national welfare and the human capital stock of the economy.
The human capital stock, denoted C , is the total labour endowment of the economy in efficiency unit which is written as follows.
( )
Effects of inflow of capital of type K
In order to examine the effects of an inflow of foreign capital of type K on social welfare and human capital stock of the economy, it is assumed that ˆ0 K > , while all other parameters remain unchanged. Here the '^' symbol suggests proportionate change.
Differentiating equations (3), (5) - (13), (14.1) and (15) the following results can be proved.
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The derivations can be obtained from the author on request.
(i)
(iv) 0 dC dK = ; and,
From (17) the following proposition can now be established. 
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From (17) the following corollaries readily follow.
Corollary 2: When 0 t = , that is, there is no tariff restriction,
From corollary 1 it entails that the presence of any labour market imperfection is a necessity for an inflow of foreign capital of type K to be welfare improving. On the other hand, from corollary 2, it is evident that in the absence of any tariff welfare unambiguously improves. We can intuitively explain the results presented in proposition 1 and corollaries 1 and 2 in the following fashion. Sectors 1 and 2 together form a Heckscher-Ohlin subsystem (HOSS) since they use the same two inputs. An inflow of capital of type K leads to a contraction of sector 1 and an expansion of sector 2 following a Rybczynski effect since the latter is more intensive in the use of capital of type K (with respect to labour) than the former. Sector G remains unaffected because of the following reasons: (i) production technology of sector G is of fixed coefficient type; and, (ii) the endowment of capital of type N , which is specific to sector G , has not changed. Now, as sector 1 contracts, more labour (in efficiency unit) are now absorbed in the higher wage-paying unionized sector 2. This is the labour reallocation effect (LRE) that raises the aggregate wage income and works positively on social welfare. There is, however, an offsetting effect, which is called the tariff revenue effect (TRE). As sector 2 expands it lowers the volume of import and hence the tariff revenue net of health subsidy, which is transferred to the consumers in a non-distortionary manner, declines. This TRE works negatively on welfare. National welfare increases if and only if LRE is stronger than TRE, i.e. In the absence of any labour market distortion, the LRE is zero. Welfare worsens following negative TRE.
On the contrary, in the absence of any tariff restrictions, there is no negative TRE. So welfare improves unequivocally.
16 As * (1 )
(see equation (9) and equation (12)), it is evident that * G P increases more than G P .
Effects of inflow of foreign capital of type N
Let us now find out of the consequences of an inflow of foreign capital of type N which is specific to the non-traded final good sector. In this case, it is assumed that ˆ0 N > , with all other parameters remaining unchanged.
Differentiating Equations (3), (5) - (13), (14.1) and (15) once more the following results can be proved.
(ix)
These results can be summarized in terms of the following proposition. The following corollary also follows from the set of results as given by (18). , implies that the magnitude of consumption subsidy (decrease in net lump-sum transfer of tariff revenue to consumers) is not less than the additional wage income generated by externalities. However, this is not at all a necessary condition. One can derive quite a few numbers of alternative sufficient conditions for the results to be valid. 
Concluding remarks
The paper has analyzed the welfare consequence of foreign capital in a small open developing economy using a three-sector, three-factor general equilibrium model with tariff and labour market distortions and a non-traded sector. The non-traded sector produces a final good (services) whose consumption directly raises the efficiency of the workers. There are two types of capital, of which capital of type K is used in all the three sectors of the economy while capital of type N is specific to the non-traded sector. So an FDI of capital of N type expands the non-traded sector thereby emanating externalities.
The analysis has found that an FDI of capital of type N although raises the human capital endowment of the economy, may affect social welfare adversely. This indicates the possibility of a trade-off between twin economic objectives of the government in a developing economy: maintaining high economic growth and improvement in human capital formation. On the contrary, an inflow of foreign capital of type K is likely to be welfare-improving. Although these effects crucially hinge on different structural factors e.g. the degree of labour market imperfection, trade-related and technological factors, they can at least question the desirability of allowing entry of foreign capital in the non-traded final good sector, especially when it generates externalities. As the parameters of the model on which the results crucially depend are amenable to policy measures these have important policy implications for overpopulated developing countries with preponderance of factor market and product market distortions and a large non-traded final good (services) sector like healthcare.
